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R E V I E W
Dispositions and Causal Powers
Max Kistler and Bruno Gnassounou (eds.),  
Dispositions and Causal Powers,  
Ashgate, 2007, 303pp., $99.95 (hbk),  
ISBN 9780754654254. 
Reviewed by Jennifer McKitrick
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Quine claimed that dispensing with disposition terms, such as “intel-
ligent” or even “water-soluble,” is a mark of the maturity of a branch 
of science.1 The contributors to this collection couldn’t disagree more. 
While some may disagree about whether dispositions cause or explain 
their manifestations, or whether powers can supplant or make sense 
of laws of nature, as the editors note, they all agree that “dispositions 
and causal powers are an essential and indispensable part of our con-
ceptual scheme” (31) including our scientific practices.
This volume is a welcome contribution to the literature, a must-
read for anyone working on or interested in dispositions. It is ideal for 
a graduate-level course or seminar in metaphysics or philosophy of 
science. In addition to dispositions and powers, this collection sheds 
light on a number of issues, especially causation and laws of nature. 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
1. “Natural Kinds” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1969, pp. 114-138).
McKitr ick  on  Disp os it ions  and  Caus al  P owers ,  NDPR  (2015)     2
The book is divided into two parts: The Metaphysics of Dispositions 
and Causal Powers, and Dispositions and Causal Powers in Science. 
However, even the selections from the metaphysics section are writ-
ten with an eye towards being informed by and applicable to science.
It is perhaps a weakness of the collection that there is not more de-
bate and disagreement. All the contributors are opposed to any sort of 
conceptual reduction and most agree that dispositions are real, caus-
ally relevant properties. While Tiercelin raises some questions for the 
dispositional realist to address, the only real debate is between Cart-
wright and Hutteman on the one hand, who think that powers are 
needed to make sense of ceteris paribus laws, and Shrenk on the other, 
who argues that powers are not up to the task.
Furthermore, the collection is slightly dated, as it is based on a 2002 
conference and doesn’t reflect much work of the last several years. For 
example, Mumford’s Dispositions (1998) is much discussed, while his 
views have significantly changed over the past decade.
The editors’ Introduction is an excellent survey of the history of 
philosophical reflection on powers and dispositions. The typical char-
acterization of this history, encapsulated by Moliere’s jest about the 
“dormitive virtue” of opium, is that medieval philosophers and scho-
lastics posited occult powers to explain things and the modern phi-
losophers showed how such explanations were inadequate. Gnassou-
nou and Kistler show that the actual history, from Aristotle through 
the Early Modern philosophers and the Logical Empiricists, was much 
more complex than most contemporary philosophers appreciate. The 
introduction concludes with helpful summaries of each contribution.
Francois Schmitz’s “Dispositions and Counterfactuals. From Carnap 
to Goodman’s Children and Grandchildren” also explains part of the 
history of thinking on dispositions. However, this selection has more 
than historical interest, as it shows the relevance of historical prob-
lems to contemporary views.
According to a simple material conditional analysis of dispositions:
For all x, x has disposition D if and only if, if x is in 
circumstance C, x exhibits manifestation M.
This analysis has the problematic consequence that everything that 
is not in circumstance C has disposition D. So, for example, everything 
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that is not submerged in water is water-soluble.
As Schmitz explains, Carnap tried to improve on this with his condi-
tional analysis:
For all x, if x is in circumstance C, x exhibits manifestation M 
if and only if x has disposition D.
However, Carnap’s analysis has the consequence that if something 
is not in circumstance C, it is indeterminate whether it has D. Some 
theorists, such as Frege and Chisholm, would find such indeterminacy 
problematic, especially for scientific applications.
According to a contemporary counterfactual analysis:
For all x, x has disposition D if and only if, if x were in 
circumstance C, x would exhibit manifestation M.
According to a Lewisian possible worlds semantics for counterfac-
tuals, this means that x exhibits M in the closest possible world in 
which x is in C.
Schmitz argues that a counterfactual analysis of dispositions suf-
fers from the same problems as Carnap’s analysis. One problem is that 
we don’t know if x exhibits M in the closest x-in-C-world unless we 
already know that x has D. If we don’t know whether an object has a 
disposition, the counterfactual analysis is no help in figuring it out. 
So, Schmitz argues, there are cases in which one cannot determine 
whether or not the dispositional concept applies. As it did for Carnap’s 
analysis, this region of indeterminacy means that dispositions aren’t 
scientifically acceptable.
However, the problems for the two analyses seem somewhat dif-
ferent. In the case where x is not in C, the consequence of the Carna-
pian analysis is not that we can’t figure out whether or not “x is D” is 
true or false. The indeterminacy is not merely epistemological. The 
consequence of Carnap’s analysis is that, in this case, “x is D” is nei-
ther true nor false.
It’s not clear that the counterfactual analysis suffers from the same 
problem. Taking it at face-value that “x is D” means that, in the clos-
est possible world in which x is in C, x exhibits M, either x is exhib-
iting M in that world or it isn’t. Seeing as we have no telescope for 
peering into other possible worlds, we can’t tell, and so perhaps we 
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are not in a position to tell whether x is D in that world. It doesn’t 
seem to follow that “x is D” is neither true nor false. If there is inde-
terminacy, it’s epistemic. The counterfactual analysis of dispositions 
does not provide one with a discovery or decision procedure for de-
termining whether a given object has a disposition. It’s not clear any 
account of what disposition terms mean could, by itself, answer such 
empirical questions.
In “The Causal Efficacy of Macroscopic Dispositional Properties” 
Max Kistler argues that while dispositions of objects with parts (what 
he calls macroscopic dispositions) may be reducible to more funda-
mental properties, such dispositions are not identical to their reduc-
ing properties, but they can have causal powers of their own. Kistler 
joins Armstrong, Shoemaker, and others in claiming that the dispo-
sitional/categorical distinction applies to predicates, not properties, 
and that any natural property can be conceived of as either categor-
ical or dispositional. To defend the causal efficacy of dispositions he 
distinguishes two senses of ‘categorical basis’ of a disposition, one be-
ing a macro-property, the disposition conceived of categorically, the 
other being the microscopic property, or reduction base, which nomo-
logically determines the macro-property. According to Kistler, a dis-
position is identical to the categorical base in the first sense, but not 
the second.
However, it’s not clear how these terminological moves help to de-
fend the causal efficacy of dispositions. Consider a common exclusion 
argument against the causal efficacy of dispositions:
1) A disposition and its categorical basis are two distinct 
properties.
2) In the circumstances of manifestation, the categorical 
basis is sufficient for the manifestation of the disposition.
3) If the instantiation of a set of properties is sufficient to 
bring about a certain effect, then all other properties are 
causally inefficacious with respect to that effect.
Therefore,
4) Dispositions with categorical bases are causally inert.
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Taking Kistler’s disambiguation of ‘categorical basis’ into account, 
and putting ‘reduction base’ in its place, we can formulate an argu-
ment that is as problematic as its predecessor. Kistler considers such 
an argument and in effect accepts (1) and (2) and rejects (3) in favor 
of the weaker claim: If the instantiation of a set of properties is suf-
ficient to bring about a certain effect, then all independent properties 
are causally inefficacious with respect to that effect. Kistler argues 
that since the reduction base nomologically determines the disposi-
tion, the properties are not independent, and the argument does not 
go through.
In “What Makes a Capacity a Disposition?” Nancy Cartwright claims 
that there are different kinds of non-categorical properties, in partic-
ular dispositions and powers on the one hand and capacities on the 
other. According to Cartwright, while both dispositions and capaci-
ties can be distinguished from their manifestations, a disposition can 
sometimes fail to exhibit its manifestation (in other words, a dispo-
sition can be latent) while some capacities are such that they are al-
ways manifesting. Dispositions are further distinguished from capac-
ities in that they are “malleable” -- they can be triggered, enhanced, 
or diminished.
While it is plausible that there are different kinds of non-categorical 
properties, the rationale for Cartwright’s way of drawing this particu-
lar distinction is not clear from this selection. Is she giving a conceptual 
analysis? If so, whose concepts is she analyzing? Many English speakers 
might take the terms ‘power’ and ‘capacity’ to be synonymous. If she’s 
offering precising definitions of these terms, to what end?
Furthermore, it’s questionable whether Cartwright’s distinctions 
hold up. Her prime example of a capacity is gravitational capacity. 
In accord with her distinction, gravity is not malleable -- it cannot 
be triggered, enhanced or diminished. But, despite her notice of the 
“two-sidedness” of capacities, Cartwright seems to be conflating the 
capacity with its manifestation. (Shrenk makes a similar point in his 
chapter.) What is the manifestation of the gravitational capacity sup-
posed to be? If it is the gravitational force, arguably that does not get 
triggered, or altered as long as the mass of the object remains the 
same. But what’s the difference between gravitational capacity and 
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gravitational force? Do we really need two things instead of one: grav-
itational capacity, which is always manifesting, and its manifestation, 
the force of gravity? If the manifestation of the gravitational capacity 
were, say, the motions of massive objects, Cartwright’s claim that the 
gravitational capacity is not malleable looks less plausible. The man-
ifestation could be triggered if something gets close enough to some-
thing to get it to move, diminished by a force pulling the object in the 
opposite direction, and enhanced by an additional force pulling the 
object in the same direction.
Another reason Cartwright distinguishes dispositions from capac-
ities is that all dispositions are possibly latent. However, this is also 
open to question. I doubt that Cartwright would call the stability of 
an office building a capacity, since her examples of capacities are all 
fundamental physical forces. However, there doesn’t seem to be any 
such thing as latent stability. If the building isn’t manifesting stabil-
ity, it doesn’t have it. So, there’s a disposition that is always manifest-
ing, which calls Cartwright’s distinction further into doubt.
In “Causation, Laws and Dispositions” Andreas Hüttemann explains 
that laws of nature describe how systems would behave if they were 
isolated -- if there were no interfering factors. But in reality, there al-
ways are interfering factors. Hüttemann argues that the only way to 
make sense of laws operating in non-ideal circumstances is to suppose 
that the laws describe the dispositions of the system. These disposi-
tions must be continuously manifestable. This doesn’t mean, as the 
name might suggest, that they lack latency, but rather that they can 
exhibit their manifestations as a matter of degree. (So if Cartwright is 
right that gravitational capacity cannot be diminished, it cannot sup-
port the law of gravity.)
In “Can Capacities Rescue us from Ceteris Paribus Laws?” Markus 
Shrenk notes that most laws of nature seem to be true only ceteris 
paribus, which puts them in danger of being tautologous, untestable, 
and incapable of supporting counterfactuals. Several authors in this 
volume (Tiercelin, Michon, Harré, and Hüttemann) suggest that dis-
positions can somehow solve these problems. Shrenk argues for the 
contrary position by pointing out problems that flow from the well-
known fact that when a disposition is triggered, its manifestation 
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occurs ceteris paribus. The same problems that plague ceteris paribus 
laws creep back at the level of dispositions.
In “Dispositions, Relational Properties and the Quantum World,” 
Mauro Dorato argues that quantum states are dispositional because 
they are relational and non-definite. However, it’s not clear that such 
features of a state go to show that it is dispositional.
Dorato claims that dispositions are relational properties for the fol-
lowing reasons: Solubility needs interaction with a liquid to manifest 
itself, and odorousness needs interaction with nostrils to manifest it-
self. However, this strikes me as a confusion. A property may stand 
in some relation to an object or substance, but that doesn’t make the 
property itself a relation. A thing can have a disposition and not ex-
hibit its manifestation. That is to say, the dispositional property fails 
to stand in the requite relation to the triggering substance or object. 
If the disposition can exist without the relation, the disposition cannot 
be a relation. If dispositions aren’t relations, Dorato’s reasoning fails.
The other reason Dorato gives for thinking quantum states are 
dispositions is also problematic. He equates dispositions with non-
definite properties and claims that the passage from disposition to 
manifestation is the same thing as the passage from indefiniteness 
to definiteness. However, it’s not clear why dispositional should be 
equated with indefinite -- properties that are objectively without a 
precise, possessed value. It seems that a copper wire can have a pre-
cise degree of conductivity, and a trigger on a gun requires a precise 
amount of pressure before it will fire, etc.
If quantum states were dispositions, and Mumford’s functional char-
acterization of dispositions is as correct as Dorato claims it is, quan-
tum states would be dispositions to produce certain manifestations in 
certain circumstances -- such as a disposition to produce a reading of 
“spin up” if the polarizing filter is at 33 degrees, and “spin down” if 
at 66 degrees. But those functional characterizations sound like mys-
terious instructions appropriate for a hidden-variables interpretation 
of quantum mechanics, rather than something neutral between the 
various interpretations, as Dorato claims.
There’s also something puzzling about Anouk Barberousse’s example 
of specific heat as a disposition in “Are Specific Heats Dispositions?” 
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Specific heat is defined as the quantity of heat a sample must absorb 
in order to increase its temperature by 1 degree. Barberousse defends 
the idea that this is a disposition by citing an associated conditional 
(roughly):
If the temperature of the sample was raised by 1 degree, it 
would absorb x amount of heat.
This is said to be typical of a disposition expressing statement, that 
is, a statement about how a thing is disposed to respond to a stim-
ulus. In this vein, a generic disposition expressing statement would 
say something like: “If the stimulus were to occur, the manifestation 
would occur.” So, in the case of specific heat, the stimulus must be the 
temperature of the sample rising 1 degree, and the manifestation must 
be the sample absorbing x amount of heat. This seems odd. Does the 
rising temperature of the sample trigger it to absorb heat? This sug-
gests that the sample’s temperature rises prior to its absorbing heat, 
which seems odd. If there’s a disposition expressing statement asso-
ciated with specific heats, Barberousse has not clearly identified it.
I regret that I only have space to briefly mention the other valuable 
contributions to this collection. Stephen Mumford’s “Filled in Space” 
attempts to allay Humean suspicions about dispositions which are not 
grounded in non-dispositional properties. Claudine Tiercelin’s “Dis-
positions and Essences” consider the case for dispositional or scien-
tific essentialism, according to which a thing’s powers are essential to 
it. Cyrille Michon’s “Opium’s Virtus Dormitiva” defends the idea that 
a disposition can causally explain its manifestation. Bruno Gnassou-
nou’s “Conditional Possibility” raises further difficulties for reducing 
disposition claims to conditional statements. Ludger Jansen’s “On As-
cribing Dispositions” argues that while dispositions can be attributed 
to classes, general properties and property instances, their attribu-
tion to particulars is most fundamental. And in “An Extended Seman-
tic Field of Dispositions and the Grounding Role of Causal Powers,” 
Rom Harré further supports the essentiality of dispositional concepts 
by arguing that the aim of physics it to explain observed regularities 
by postulating unobservable powers.
